Ram in the Courtroom

Written by Krishiv Agarwal

Edited by Yatika Singh

Krishiv is a first-year student studying politics and economics at Sciences Po Paris, Campus du Havre.

Why Ayodhya was Never Just Another Land Dispute

The Ayodhya Ram Janmabhoomi–Babri Masjid dispute is often described as a religious or political conflict but the final judgment delivered in M. Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das (2019) was formally a decision in a title suit, concerned with possession, evidence, and competing proprietary claims over a land measuring approximately 2.77 acres in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. However, its history of unstable possession, and the role of faith in structuring claims make it an extraordinary land dispute.

The disputed land is believed by many Hindus to be the birthplace of Lord Ram, on which the Babri Masjid stood from the sixteenth century. This overlapping claim formed the core of the conflict. Tensions date back at least to the nineteenth century, with recorded clashes in 1855 and the modern legal battle began in 1949, when idols of Ram were placed inside the mosque, prompting a Faizabad court to attach the property under Section 145 to maintain public order. In 1950, the first suits were filed by Hindu parties seeking the right to worship and in 1961, the muslim parties filed a suit asserting possession of the mosque. All suits were transferred to the Allahabad High Court, which in 2010. That judgment was appealed, stayed by the Supreme Court in 2011, and ultimately culminated in the 2019 decision that finally settled the title.

By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the dispute had already reshaped public life in India. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement of the 1980s and the 1990 Rath Yatra intensified mobilisation around the site, leading to widespread communal riots and political polarisation. The demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 triggered violence across the country. What formally appeared before the Court as a civil title appeal therefore carried decades of conflict, loss, and mobilisation behind it, making the final judgment far more consequential than an ordinary land dispute.

Introduction

The site was divided into an inner courtyard and the outer courtyard. The inner courtyard contained the structure identified as the Babri Masjid, built in the sixteenth century, while the outer courtyard was used for Hindu worship. This physical division was a result of colonial intervention following repeated conflicts between Hindu and Muslim worshippers; the British erected railings and grill bricked walls in the mid-nineteenth century to separate the two spaces, allowing limited and regulated access to both communities. It should be noted that this was an administrative arrangement, meant to preserve order, and not a division of the ownership of the land. Furthermore, the Supreme Court treated the site as a composite whole as all the parties claimed the possession of the full area comprising both the inner and outer courtyard and none of them accepted the railing as a valid division of land. In fact, the court overturned the High Court ruling that divided the land between the Muslim and the Hindu trusts.

This article analyses how these legal standards were applied in an exceptional context. It examines the Court’s treatment of possession, the use and limits of faith as context, the handling of absence of evidence, and the ambiguities within statutory interpretation and its implications for future disputes involving religion, history, and property law.

The Case as a Title Suit: Legal Framing

Under Indian property law, title suits are decided primarily on evidence of possession i.e. continuous, open, and peaceful use rather than a question of origin or moral entitlement. The Court repeatedly emphasised that it was not deciding whether a temple was destroyed to build a mosque, nor whether Lord Ram was historically born at the disputed site. Even though this formal framing seems necessary to take an objective decision, the proceedings repeatedly reflected how it was not compatible with the case’s history. For instance, to plead adverse possession under the Indian Penal Code the plaintiffs must carry the burden of acknowledging the title as originally belonging to the entity against whom they plead; and then meet a threshold of having peaceful and continued possession to the knowledge of the true title holder to claim the ownership of it. This requirement can be seen as incompatible with a case regarding a land disputed over centuries as it puts the plaintiffs in a position of disadvantage by automatically making the other party an owner and having to prove continuous possession from a time where records were scarce or don’t meet the evidentiary standards of today. The court, in fact, observed that there was ‘ambivalence’ in the addressing of the adverse possession in the proceedings by the muslim parties due to this very reason.

Another interesting feature of the dispute was that it was represented by the deity Ram himself. The suit filed in 1989 treated Ram Lalla Virajman as a juristic person capable of holding property and asserting legal rights. Indian courts have long recognised deities as legal entities, and in this case, the deity and the Janmabhoomi were represented through a ‘next friend,’ Deoki Nandan Agrawal, under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court accepted this framework holding that granting legal personality to the deity was a necessity to safeguard the property as no clear managing trusts existed but rejected the idea of extending legal personality to immovable property like the Janmbhoomi.

Ultimately, the verdict awarded the land to the Hindu parties as they had demonstrated a ‘better footing’ in having an uncontested, acknowledged, and continuous possession for a longer period of time as opposed to the Muslim parties, particularly when the site was treated as a composite whole comprising both the inner and outer courtyards.

The verdict turns on the absence of proof of Muslim worship, possession, or ownership of the inner courtyard prior to 1856–57, and the fact that any possession after 1867 was consistently contested. This absence of evidence is not neutral and weighs against the muslim parties because, as explained before, a claim based on adverse possession requires proof of open, continuous, and uncontested possession for a period between twelve and twenty years. As a result, the final judgment can be read as a decision in probability rather than certainty. The Court relied on three linked factors: the Hindu parties’ uncontested possession of the outer courtyard, the long-standing belief that the site was the birthplace of Ram, and evidence of Hindu worship in the inner courtyard by offering prayers towards the garbh griha. However, this overlooks the possibility that Hindu possession of the outer courtyard, especially after 1856, may have remained largely uncontested precisely because the area held limited religious importance for the Muslim parties. The absence of Muslim evidence regarding the outer courtyard does not necessarily indicate acceptance or abandonment; it may simply reflect a lack of incentive to document assertion of possession. Treating the entire site as a composite whole therefore becomes problematic, as the balance of probability ultimately rests on the outer courtyard belonging to the Hindu parties, a conclusion that itself is shaped by selective evidentiary weight rather than equal consideration of absence.

This judgement can be put into this simple reasoning. Evidence clearly showed exclusive long-standing Hindu possession of the outer courtyard. The inner courtyard was more contentious, where the muslim parties failed to establish exclusive, uncontested, and continuous possession or worship. And since the entry to the inner courtyard is only through the outer courtyard the ownership of the entire premises is better suited to the hindu parties. Following this logic it might seem that the verdict was primarily based on evidence where faith was used only as a contextualising force. However, when we go beyond the verdict and analyse the standards used to define key elements of the decision like the probable hindu worship in the inner courtyard or the existence of a mosque, one finds faith being embedded in what even is considered to be justified evidence.

The Danger of using Faith as Context

Despite the Court repeatedly insisting that faith did not determine the outcome, it played an undeniable role in explaining why certain patterns of use existed. For instance, the bench accepted that the structure in the inner courtyard (Babri Masjid) functioned as a mosque based on Muslim belief disapproving P.M Mishra’s argument of Babri Masjid not being a valid mosque according to the Shariyat. The Court stated that, ‘it is inappropriate to enter an area of theology and to assume the role of an interpreter of Hadees… The belief and faith of the worshipper in offering namaz at a place which is for the worshipper a mosque cannot be challenged.’ This reflects that the court prioritized a kind of practiced belief (people of religion offering worship) over doctrinal belief to decide a key element of this case.

Subsequently, Muslim parties argued that the presence of a mosque from the sixteenth century established continuous worship and acknowledged possession. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the existence of a structure alone does not prove possession without evidence of, specifically, regular offering of namaz. Therefore the use of faith, in this situation, seems to be inherently contradictory as it considers a structure to be a place of worship (mosque) while denying its existence to be a sign of continuous worship.

This reasoning is also a significant legal shift. In cases involving religious properties, courts have often relied on longstanding recognition of religious character. Here, the Court required proof of use, not merely a status. Thus, the absence of evidence showing Muslim worship between 1528 and 1857 was treated as a decisive gap.

Additionally, faith also came into discussion when the opposition questioned the hindu parties’ uncontested continuous possession of the outer courtyard by asserting that hindu scriptures do not mention Ayodhya as the birth place of Ram, hence asserting that, the belief is arbitrary which decreases the likeliness of their long possession over the outer courtyard. This argument was later disproved by Swami Avimuktswaranand Saraswati by referring to the Skanda Puran showcasing the exact location of the birth place of Ram to be that of the claimed area.

Even though this was only referred to in the addenda, the fact that the court entertained the argument goes to show that faith played a role beyond just a contextualizing force. It reflects how faith became the basis of certain arguments essential to the verdict as it can be suggested that if the hindu side was unable to produce the scriptures the bench would have agreed with the opposition's claim, weakening the continuous possession of the hindu parties despite already presenting legal proof. This raises an important question: when does belief become evidence? In Ayodhya, belief explained customs, and customs established possession. Thus the logic might seem legally defensible, but is logically very delicate.

Implications and Broader Significance

The 1045 pages long Ayodhya Verdict and the reaction to it by scholars makes it clear that it holds significance well beyond a 1500 yard land. In the final parts of the verdict the court explicitly addresses the responsibilities and capabilities of the Indian judiciary. For instance, the Supreme Court defines the conditions of using laws in situations of historical wrongdoings by stating that courts can only intervene where past acts produce legal consequences that are enforceable in the present. In other words, for the court history matters only to the extent that it structures present-day rights and claims. 

Another significant legal impact of the case is related to the representation of deities in court. Even though the practice of recognising deities as juristic persons is not unique to the case, doing so in the apex court of India sets a precedent that the court can, if required, move away from a strict requirement of documentary title or uninterrupted physical possession. This approach becomes useful in cases where historical records are incomplete or disrupted by state control and social conflict. While this allows resolution of issues rooted in uncertainty, it also raises concerns that communities whose access, records, or practices were curtailed may be disadvantaged when absence of documentation is treated as absence of right.

Lastly, the Court’s decision to allot an alternative five-acre plot for the construction of a mosque in Ayodhya goes beyond the narrow function of a title suit. While the ownership of the disputed land was decided on evidentiary grounds, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 was an illegal act and a serious violation of the rule of law. By ordering the state to provide land to the Sunni Waqf Board, the Court accepted a form of institutional responsibility, even though it held that illegality could not determine title. This move reflects an attempt to balance legal finality with constitutional morality. The remedy does not undo the harm, but recognises it, marking an effort to preserve the legitimacy of the judicial process in a dispute where legal reasoning alone could not address the full scope of the injustice involved.

Bibliography

BBC News. Babri mosque: The build-up to a demolition that shook India. 5 Dec, 2017.

“History of the Ayodhya Title Dispute: A Timeline.” Supreme Court Observer, 29 Nov. 2024.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Government of India.

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M. Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das. (2019) 18 SCC 1. Supreme Court of India.

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