The Chinese Smart Court Reform: A Judicial Revolution to be observed

Written by Alix Gerrier

Edited by Gursehaj Gosal

Alix Gerrier is an undergraduate student in the Dual Degree between Sciences Po Paris and Hong Kong University in Le Havre Campus. She plans to major in Politics and Government and pursue her academic interests relating to law, Chinese governance, poetry, and the culture and history of good food.

Introduction:

If the notion of “computerized justice” first spawned in the mid-20th century with thinkers like Loevinger, the idea of “intelligent justice” has long been considered as technological Prometheanism. However, China has enacted the techno-legal revolution by reforming and tailoring courts to the needs of the party-state through a Smart Court Reform (SCR). The pioneer is currently leveraging innovative “smart” technologies to adapt its judicial system to the digital age while strengthening its dual legal-political role. This offers interesting perspectives for onlooking judiciaries worldwide.

The SCR, or “judicial informatization,” refers to the far-reaching efforts to digitalize, automate, and enhance every level of China’s judiciary through the integration of advanced technology. Beyond information technology (IT), this includes the integration of artificial intelligence (A.I.), big data analytics, and automated decision-making (ADM) nourished by centralized databases [1]. In sum, all judicial processes are to be conducted on and supported by “intelligent legal applications.” In court, judges remain the final adjudicators, albeit with the aid of technology. Smart courts were first explicitly defined in the 2017 Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) Opinion on Accelerating Smart Court Construction as “people’s courts that make full use of advanced information systems to support online handling of all business, full-process disclosure in accordance with the law, and all-round intelligent services to achieve a fair judiciary (…) for the people.” Though defined in 2017, the first efforts of the SCR may be traced back to the 2013 Five-Year Development Plan for Informatization Construction of People’s Courts.

When examining the SCR, it is critical to first recognize the dual role of the Chinese judiciary and the importance of the “people-focused” ideology. Value frameworks are what define “fairness” in any regime. Unlike liberal rule-of-law countries where the judiciary strives to be neutral, Chinese courts are political. Their first function, as any court, is to provide normal judicial services to resolve the wide range of social and economic conflicts. Their second function, however, is to maintain social stability and implement the Party’s central policies. This makes them a critical element of political governance. The importance of social stability in Chinese governance means the State must be able to intervene throughout the legal process to eliminate threats or “rectify” decisions so as to define its interests, but without disrupting the overall legal system. As summarized by Papagianneas: “Chinese courts exist to serve both the prerogative and normative state”[2]. This article will notably examine how this duality is enabled by comprehensive digitalization and surveillance. Moreover, one must recognize that the “people-focused ideology” may also serve to check the SCR. Indeed, the weight of public trust in regime stability compels the party-state to regulate the SCR to guarantee the protection of rights.

In the first section of this article, we will examine how the SCR has enabled China to consolidate its unique dual-functioned judiciary, thus legitimizing a weaker branch of government while also  strengthening vertical control. In the second section, we will analyze China’s efficient but cautious pioneering, which may serve as an interesting example to courts worldwide that seek to adapt justice to an increasingly overwhelming digital age.

1. The Smart Court Reform strengthening the Chinese judiciary and its dual functions

In this first section, we will examine how the SCR has allowed the consolidation of the unique dual identity of the Chinese judiciary by inscribing itself in the context of larger reforms starting after 2013, notably the modernization of state governance and judicial reform. The “modernization of state governance” was outlined in the 2019 Decision on Upholding and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Modernizing the State System and Capacity for Governance and may be defined as the modernization of the administrative, legislative, and judicial organs through which the party-state controls society and decentralized local entities. Moreover, the 2014 “judicial responsibility reform” entails transforming the political supervision of justice to guarantee Chinese “fairness.” This may be defined as the absence of corruption, the correction of popularly contested decisions, and the respect of central policies.[3]

The SCR constitutes the judicial-technical arm of China’s “modernization of state governance,” which entails efficient case management, the uniform application of law, and the centralization of authority. Zhou Qiang, the SPC’s former president, notably called to propel smart court construction “to build a socialist judicial system, to meet the people’s expectations for a better life, to achieve the goal of socialist modernization, and to build a higher-level rule of law.”[4] Currently, the SCR supports modernization by increasing efficiency and decreasing workload, harmonizing judicial reasoning, and bolstering accessibility through complete digitalization.

Firstly, the establishment of smart systems nationwide has diminished judicial delays, costs, and workload while increasing output. This is partially a response to the uniquely intense pressure on Chinese courts. In 2015, there were over 16.714 million court cases filed in China, 27.3 times the number recorded in 1978. Meanwhile, there were 196,000 judges, only 3.27 times more than in 1981 [5]. As a response, the 2016 Five-Year Plan for the Informatization of People’s Courts and the 2017 Opinion called for the full digitization and automation of judicial and administrative processes. Remarkable examples include the Faxin 2.0 Smart Push System and Anhui Province’s case-handling system.

The SPC’s Faxin 2.0 Smart Push System, released in 2020, is one of the first case-handling systems developed for nationwide use. It uses big data analytics to process legal provisions, cases, opinions, and court decisions to provide support specifically in the preparatory stage of the judicial process through three functions. First, it matches and compares incoming case files based on the files within the system to create a “case portrait” that provides an overview of all significant information. Second, it pushes cases, judicial documents, and decisions for reference. Third, the system pushes relevant legislation and even specific provisions. Moreover, it evaluates the validity of a provision for a given case, explicates the intentions behind said provision, and so on. Thus, the system automates most of the pre-trial preparation for judges, requiring from them mostly oversight and alleviating their workload [6].

Another, more recent example is Anhui’s AI-assisted case-handling system launched in 2025. Its application scenarios include, but are not limited to, document-drafting assistance, supervision of investigation procedures, or inconsistency detection [7] . After just two months of trial, time for reviewing cases and writing documents was reportedly reduced by 50% to 70% [8] . On the national scale, it was reported that by 2022 the SCR had already reduced clerical work by 30% and improved trial efficiency by 20% [9].

Secondly, the SCR supports a harmonized application of law as dictated by the “similar cases, similar judgment” principle, thus heightening Chinese “fairness.” In 2014, the Decision concerning Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance According to Law pledged to “make the people feel fairness and justice in every judicial case,” notably by guaranteeing consistent judicial reasoning across China [3]. The SCR has enabled this, as illustrated by the Faxin 2.0 Push System and Shanghai’s High Court 206 System.

Though framed as a tool to reduce workload, the Faxin 2.0 Smart Push System’s primary purpose is to achieve consistency in adjudication through a “push factor” and a “deviation trigger". Indeed, the nationally integrated software “pushes”  legislation and reference materials to judges from a centralized database, therefore orienting their reasoning. Moreover, a “deviation trigger” warns judges when their judgment deviates too much from the average judgment in similar cases, thus encouraging them to rethink the decision, as deviation from the consensus may affect career prospects [2].

Another example is the “Shanghai AI-Assisted Criminal Case-Handling System” (206 System), China’s most advanced AI-assisted decision-making system for criminal cases. All pending cases in Shanghai go through the system, and all front-line legal practitioners are expected to use it [10]. Application occurs at three moments. In the procuratorial stage, the system assists prosecutors in their pretrial arrest or detention decision-making by evaluating one’s “social dangerousness” through 50 variables. Furthermore, same-case recommendations based on national precedents help prosecutors formulate precise sentencing recommendations. Moreover, the system standardizes procedures, notably guaranteeing evidentiary standards, which is particularly significant as evidence is perceived as truth [11].

In the trial stage, judges are mandated to conduct an exhaustive search of similar cases through the 206 System. The system includes “directive” cases by higher courts and prioritizes cases released within the last three years to “guide” decisions. However, judges maintain final decisional power. In the final moments of supervision, the 206 System compares the judge’s decision to an expected decision and warns judges of important “deviations.” Substantial discrepancies may invoke the intervention of court leadership, thus compelling judges to observe the system’s recommendations. Both this “deviation warning” and the Faxin 2.0 Push System’s “deviation trigger” constitute crucial elements of central oversight.

It is important to note that unlike Western judiciaries, China conceives technology as a rational and scientific tool that may support fairness. Thus, China seems to be moving toward an algorithm-empowered case-law system to eliminate the “human factor” [12].  Justice Yadong Cui summarizes this ambition: “AI can provide relatively streamlined judicial reasoning and evaluation standards, provide the judge with all similar cases, laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations, etc., so the judge can strictly follow the rule of evidence and procedure, which will reduce judicial arbitrariness and promote justice” [5].

The SCR’s third contribution to “modernize state governance” is rendering justice more accessible and convenient. Chinese courts have traditionally suffered from opacity and procedural complexity. Thus, the SCR aims to lower practical and physical barriers through strengthened legal awareness and online services [13].

Firstly, “judicial openness” platforms enable citizens to better grasp their rights and the law. There are two main verdict-disclosure websites set up by the SPC: China Judgments Online, launched in 2013, which holds over 140 million court decisions, and the People’s Courts Case Database [6]. The latter, released in 2024, is much more curated, with only 4,338 “influential cases” reviewed by the SPC as of December 2024. Yang Wanming presented the benefits of the database through the example of a case involving a man imprisoned for mentally abusing his ex-girlfriend. He noted the case renders comprehensible recent legal evolutions: “The case identified mental control as a kind of maltreatment (…) and also showed that those living together for a period, or starting a relationship for marriage, should be deemed family members” [14].

Second, three “Internet Courts” dedicated to online-activity-related disputes have been erected since 2017, reducing accessibility barriers and saving citizens time and money. The Beijing Internet Court (BIC), for example, renders the “whole litigation process available online at any time and anywhere,” with digital procedures for filing, evidence submission, hearings, and judgments. Moreover, “mobile courts” like the Mobile Micro Court app embedded in WeChat offer litigation services on a one-stop practical platform [15]. An increasing number of disputes are resolved online without requiring plaintiffs and defendants to leave their homes, thereby reducing travel time, cost, and impracticalities. For example, in 2022, the court of Tuanlin in Jiangxi moved a labor dispute over wages online “because the plaintiff and defendant were in two different provinces (…) with both parties’ consent” [16]. Thus, by promoting user convenience, the judiciary gains legitimacy and stimulates public satisfaction.

In sum, the “modernization of state governance” is both an end and a vector that pushes the SCR’s development to create an efficient, standardized, and accessible normative state. However, if the SCR aims to legitimize and generate popular satisfaction, it also aims to strengthen the party-state’s vertical control over decentralized local courts.

Smart systems’ comprehensive digital supervision has allowed the consolidation of the dual function of the Chinese court through a “judicial accountability” reform and unobtrusive government intervention. Historically, supervision was assured by the “Review and Approval of Judgment System,” where court leaders directly reviewed decisions. However, rampant corruption led to the 2014 “Judicial Accountability Reform,” in which “he who hears the case shall make the judgment and be liable” for life [17]. The reform sparked concerns regarding the lack of a clear supervision system to hold judges accountable. The SCR has effectively provided a solution to this dilemma through “trial supervision and management,” a technical mechanism through which adjudication is continuously monitored and vertically controlled. The 2017 Opinion notably asked courts to develop digital trial-management platforms encompassing the entire process. Several model cases were presented in the 2021 China Court Informatization Development Report and subsequently analyzed by Stratton Papagianneas. This article will focus on the Jiangxi Provincial High Court [18].

The Jiangxi Provincial High Court developed a “Trial-e Management Platform” that enables court leaders to supervise remanded cases, long-term unresolved cases, and “Four Types of Special Cases”. These are cases that are major and sensitive, that might have an impact on social stability, that conflict with other rulings, or where illegal trial conduct has been reported [19]. Moreover the platform aims to tackle persistent issues such as communication within and between courts and procedural mistakes due to case volume. 

The platform applies “trial supervision and management” through five main functions. First, court leaders may monitor cases  at any time via the platform, but they may not unduly interfere and supervise exclusively through the platform. The platform has limited supervisory measures, thus limiting actions, and records every action. Surveillance itself is thus supervised. Moreover, the platform acts as a discussion channel between courts for remanded cases. If disagreement persists, the case is reviewed by a High Court case-review committee composed through the platform with personnel from a centralized database. Everything in this process is recorded.

Second, the platform manages long-term unresolved cases across Jiangxi Province and facilitates their transfer to the High Court. Overdue cases automatically trigger intelligent identification of the causes of delay and are transferred. This is important because such cases are often sensitive and must be addressed rapidly. Third, the platform’s AI automatically detects the “Four Types of Cases” and transfers them to court leaders whose response is supervised, thereby allowing  rapid resolution while maintaining central supervision. The fourth function is “case information data-quality monitoring,” where the platform automatically detects and repairs data errors and omissions. The fifth function is “judicial risk dynamic prevention and control,” which sends warnings in cases of procedural errors by personnel. Notably, this generates data to evaluate the performance of judges and court leaders.

In short, beyond acting as a smart tool supporting efficiency, the platform is a supervisor regulating behaviors and overall processes. Judges work on a single platform that records their actions, thus creating a “closed-choice architecture” heightening accountability [18]. This pressures judges to self-regulate their behavior, which in turn limits the need for court-leader intervention. Similarly, this system renders improper court-leader interference difficult, thus, in a certain way, protecting judicial autonomy. Stratton analyzed the phenomenon as a “digital iron cage”: a digitally closed environment constantly regulating the behavior of all personnel. By strengthening vertical control, the SCR allows the party-state to create an efficient normative system while simultaneously allowing extensive supervision and intervention that does not disrupt the legal system. The SCR thus presents itself as a tool particularly suited to the needs of China’s politico-legal system and will likely elevate the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis other government institutions.

The SCR is tailored to consolidate China’s dual-functioned judiciary; however, it also makes China a pioneer of global influence. Observing Chinese experimentation may provide valuable insight for liberal democratic judiciaries seeking to modernize justice at a time when most legal systems have been unable to keep pace with the exponentially rapid development of AI.

2. The process of pioneering: adapting to a digital age

China’s unprecedented integration of judicial technology provides a potential method to adapt courts to the digital age. Thus, studying the SCR may help foreign judiciaries refine their own strategies, aims, and considerations. Three components this article focuses on are China’s process of pioneering, the hazardous technological foundation of smart courts, and the regulated integration of new technologies.

China’s SCR has successfully balanced rapidity with caution through a habitual development method that merges fragmented local experimentation with top-down policy guidance.

Unlike other aspects of judiciary construction, there were very few experiences for China to learn from for the SCR, thus entitling it to the title of “pioneer.” To develop the SCR, China’s strategy has been to “cross the river by feeling the stones,” meaning making small-scale experiments to improve practices [6]. The 2013–2017 Development Plan notably encouraged local trials while simultaneously asserting the SPC as coordinator and manager, ensuring central control. This method is efficient because running multiple trials nationwide provides the SPC with a vast overview of the prospects and issues of digitalization, allowing it to issue common directives to uniformize the judiciary.

This approach was used, for example, in 2015 for two pilot “e-courts” designated by the SPC: the Jilin High Court and the Zhejiang High Court. Both adopted different approaches to informatization. These trials led to the release of the 2016 Electronic Archive Opinion, the first concrete guideline on digitalization, while simultaneously generating big data. It directed courts to create processes “where digital versions of litigation documents would be generated during the judicial process.”

However, this system of local trials also creates inequality between provinces with varying resources, thus potentially raising concerns of fairness. The SPC counters this issue through central documents allowing it to steer disparate practices into a unified national approach. These documents include “Guiding Opinions,” which act as soft law; legally binding “Rules”; five-year development plans for larger reforms; and White Papers evaluating said reforms. For example, the 2017 Opinion instructed courts nationwide to use Provincial High Courts as models, thereby facilitating controlled and organized development.

Currently, China is focusing on consolidation and aims for a strong, stable, and well-accepted judiciary. Because rapid innovation outpaces  incorporation into law and creates legal uncertainty, a critical turning point has been the creation of a legal framework: the Smart Court Rules. Between 2021 and 2022, the Online Litigation Rules (OLR), the Online Mediation Rules (OMR), and the Online Operation Rules (OOR) were released. These are the most authoritative documents shaping digital litigation and highlight three themes: consistency, fairness, and efficiency. The OOR regulates internal procedures and indicates that courts must prioritize nationally unified information systems. A key takeaway of the Rules is the protection of rights, notably ownership over digital proceedings and the requirement of informed consent for online litigation. Parties may even withdraw their consent mid-proceedings, granting citizens significant control. This compromise on efficiency likely aims to consolidate trust in the SCR.

In sum, China’s pioneering was facilitated by the flexibility of soft-law policies allowing central authorities to learn from local experimentation while imparting a national direction. The legal framework emerged relatively late so as not to hinder development and then to consolidate legitimacy. However, this method is perhaps only possible due to the party-state’s authority and the absence of a strong legal tradition [12]. In contrast, the European Union proceeded by first establishing a legal and ethical framework, notably the 2024 AI Act, to regulate AI development. AI systems that assist decision-making are considered “high-risk,” thus limiting their use primarily to administrative support [20]. Recent projects such as the 2025 ADJUST initiative are nonetheless exploring the potential of ADM and the “balance between innovation and the right to a fair trial” [21].

Examining the building blocks of the SCR provides valuable insight into the hazards of judicial modernization, notably the selection of training data and collaboration with private enterprises. Indeed, machine learning raises issues of algorithmic bias and the “black box” dilemma, which largely explains democratic reluctance.

AI inevitably reflects the biases of its training data, making data selection a critical consideration. Judicial data for the SCR was largely collected through three transparency platforms established in 2013, which require courts to disclose adjudicative, procedural, and enforcement data then used to train algorithmic tools. Notably, China Judgments Online is a nationwide database hosting over 140 million decisions [22]. Moreover, the Opinion on Electronic Archives emphasizes that data quality and consistency must be guaranteed and outlines how digital files should be collected and reviewed.

An interesting prospect for foreign judiciaries may be purposefully value-aligned bias. This can be observed in the People’s Courts Case Database: selected cases are edited and annotated in SPC meetings that discuss the application of law and value orientation [23]. This logic aligns with the outcome-focused politico-legal system. While Western judiciaries strive to govern the present impartially, Chinese institutions exist to achieve a collective utopian future. Because AI is necessarily biased, modernizing judiciaries should examine how their value frameworks may be supported by data.

A second critical consideration is the use of private enterprises to develop judicial technologies, which raises questions of external influence and privacy. China’s solution is close collaboration allowing the implementation of procedural safeguards. For example, iFlytek, a state-owned enterprise, developed the 206 System. The task force was composed of Shanghai’s courts, procuratorates, public security organs, and technical staff from iFlytek. Thus, the system was developed by both legal and technical experts. Other enterprises involved include Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu. China’s approach, novel in scale, may interest Europe amid growing concerns over digital sovereignty. However, Zheng remarks that such non-contractual cooperation between companies, courts, and universities may be impossible in liberal free-market democracies.

Finally, technological innovations such as Internet Courts and trailblazing legislation tailored to the digital age may offer valuable perspectives to reluctant foreign judiciaries.

Internet Courts represent significant innovation as they are the first courts dedicated to the growing number of internet-related disputes, such as e-commerce or copyright claims, at a time when many judiciaries are overwhelmed by rapid technological progress. There are currently three: the Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and Beijing Internet Courts, launched between 2017 and 2018. They are innovative but not disruptive, as law naturally evolves to meet the demands of an era. In Yu Binhua v. Guangzhou Huaduo Network Technology Co., the Guangzhou Internet Court, for example, developed a legal doctrine on tipping for online performances and webcasting. Such specialized courts could help alleviate the strain on European judiciaries caused by the growing volume of AI-related disputes.

Furthermore, China’s elaboration of AI-usage regulations for both courts and litigants may inspire foreign judiciaries. For example, the 2022 Opinion on Strengthening Blockchain Application in the Judicial Field clarifies how courts may recognize and verify blockchain-stored electronic evidence, moving blockchain from experimentation into procedural law. China is also innovating regarding litigants’ use of AI. In September 2025, the Xiamen Maritime Court released the Guidelines for Litigation Participants’ Use of AI, which require litigants to disclose tool specifications, input data, parameters, and more [7]. Interestingly, China published an English version of the Blockchain Opinion, seemingly publicizing its techno-legal pioneering.

Conclusion

China’s SCR demonstrates that judicial modernization is not, and should not be considered, a neutral endeavor. Even when innovation seeks “fairness,” that concept remains embedded in a specific value framework. In China, the SCR has strengthened state governance through a more efficient, standardized, and accessible legal system, producing a “fairer” judiciary that ultimately supports regime stability. This fairness is enforced through a digital “iron cage” that limits corruption and divergence from central policy objectives. Far from weakening judicial authority, comprehensive digitalization has legitimized a traditionally weaker branch by aligning it  with social stability, policy implementation, and popular satisfaction.

Although the value framework underlying China’s judiciary differs sharply from that of liberal democratic systems, China’s clear politico-legal aims and centralized authority greatly facilitated the SCR, making it particularly suited to pioneer in this field. Its reform method, combining local experimentation, central coordination, and delayed legislation, enabled rapid nationwide implementation. While this model should not be transposed directly to Europe, smaller-scale experimentation supported by European cooperation may offer a viable alternative.

China also provides instructive approaches to persistent concerns over data quality and reliance on private technology firms, notably through tailored bias management and close public–private partnerships. Still, the SCR does not address all dimensions of judicial modernization, particularly its ecological cost. Perhaps most importantly for Europe is ensuring that caution does not become paralysis. Ultimately, the reform suggests that the future of justice will depend less on whether courts adopt AI than on how they discipline it through data selection, procedural design, and normative orientation.

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