The Modern Re-Abolition of Slavery? Efficacies of the 2018-2025 Reforms to Foreign Labour Laws in Qatar

Written by Zonglun Li

Edited by Audrey Lo

Zonglun Li is a first year dual degree student in the Dual BA Program between Sciences Po Paris and the National University of Singapore. His research interests lie in Political Economics and Comparative Systems.

Introduction

The 2022 FIFA World Cup, initially meant to be a showcase of Qatari prestige, inadvertently transformed the nation into a global courtroom for human rights. Leading up to the tournament, organizations like The Guardian and Human Rights Watch extensively documented the systematic mistreatment of the migrant workforce that underpinned the event's construction (The Guardian, n.d.).

Central to this exploitation was the Kafala (sponsorship) system—a regional legal framework tying a worker’s residency to a single employer, thereby restricting movement and silencing abuse reports (Robinson 2022). Driven by the so-called "World Cup Effect," mounting international pressure compelled Qatar to address the exploitative system. The government initiated a series of reforms, most notably the 2018 Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP). Launched in partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO), this multi-year collaborative project aimed to align Qatar's labor market with international standards (International Labour Organisation 2023).

Today, Doha claims to be the first Gulf state to effectively abolish Kafala. Yet, audits suggest a persistent gap between legislative policy and on-the-ground practice (Ministry of Labour, State of Qatar 2022). This article analyzes Qatar's post-2018 reforms, assessing whether these de jure amendments adequately address the de facto mistreatment of foreign workers.

Context: Qatar and Foreign Labour

Qatar's economy heavily relies on non-national labor, particularly in low-skilled sectors. National Planning Council data shows expatriates comprise roughly 94.7% of the total workforce, surging to over 99% in low-skilled industries like construction and domestic services (ILO Regional Office for the Arab States 2025). Before 2018, these foreign laborers were governed by Kafala, with the foundational rules codified in Law No. 4 of 2009 Regarding Regulation of the Expatriates' Entry, Departure, Residence and Sponsorship (see Table 1).

In 2015, these laws were re-codified in Law No. 21 of 2015 Regulating the Entry, Exit, and Residence of Expatriates to nominally prevent forced labor. However, this merely rebranded employers from ‘sponsors’ to ‘recruiters’, slightly softened Exit Permit rules via government vetoes, and created brief windows for transferring jobs without a No Objection Certificate (NOC). These superficial amendments failed to dismantle the underlying control mechanisms, leaving mistreated workers unable to easily switch jobs, quit, or leave the country.

Aspect	Legal Basis (2009-2016)	Legal Basis (2016-2018)	Consequence
Sponsorship Tie	Law No. 4 of 2009, art. 18 & 21	Law No. 21 of 2015,  art. 17	Workers’ legal residency is strictly bound to a single employer.
Exit Permit	Law No. 4 of 2009, art. 18	Law No. 21 of 2015, art. 7 & 14	Mandatory employer authorization is required to leave the country for any reason.
No Objection Certificates (NOC) Requirement	Law No. 4 of 2009, art. 22	Law No. 21 of 2015, art. 21	Employer permission (No Objection Certificate) is required to change jobs.
Law on Absconding	Law No. 4 of 2009, art. 11 & 51	Law No. 21 of 2015, art. 19	Leaving a job without permission is a criminal offense punishable by deportation.
Table 1: Legal Components of the Pre-2018 Kafala System in Qatar

Beyond formal statutes, entrenched customs undermine foreign worker security. Despite explicit legal prohibitions in Law No. 4 of 2009 and Law No. 21 of 2015, passport confiscation remains a pervasive coercion tactic (Human Rights Watch 2020). Furthermore, the illicit charging of recruitment fees (fees paid by workers for job placement) in origin countries persists, ignoring Qatar Labour Law No. 14 of 2004 on the promulgation of Labour Law. Often exceeding a year's wages, these fees trap migrants in debt-bondage, rendering de jure labor mobility irrelevant for the most vulnerable (Pattisson and Acharya 2022).

This vulnerability is compounded by the prohibition of trade unions for non-nationals, stripping workers of collective bargaining and systemic redress. Rampant wage theft, unfair wage policies—such as “pay when paid” clauses—and historically poor compensation audits exacerbate financial stress. Furthermore, a lack of employer accountability for safe working conditions has led to devastating outcomes, including a debated death toll of over 6,500 between 2011 and 2020, alongside hundreds of thousands of injuries (Pattisson et al. 2021; Francesca Re and Max Tunon 2021).

Collectively, these mechanisms trap low-skilled foreign workers in conditions that human rights advocates frequently describe as modern slavery.

Reforms: Origins and Successes

Following intense scrutiny over the World Cup bid, international labor organizations flagged Kafala's non-compliance with the Forced Labour Convention. This culminated in a 2013 joint representation to the ILO and a formal high-level complaint in 2014 (International Labour Organisation 2023). As an ILO member state, Qatar was held accountable for its system. After years of negotiations, the complaint was conditionally resolved: Qatar had cooperated with the ILO to enforce necessary labor reforms.

This initiated the TCP and established the first ILO Project Office in Qatar to oversee compliance with international standards (International Labour Organisation 2023). During its first phase (2018–2021), ILO-Qatari collaboration successfully dismantled several key features of the Kafala system (see Table 2). Namely, it led to Law No. 13 of 2018 Amending Certain Provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015, the Decision of the Minister of Interior No. 95 of 2019 Concerning the Regulations and Procedures Regarding the Exit of Certain Categories of Workers Who are Not Subject to the Labour Law, Law No. 17 of 2020 on the Determination of the Minimum Wage for Workers and Domestic Workers, and Law No. 18 of 2020 Amending Some Provisions of Law No. 14 of 2004, and Law No. 19 of 2020 Amending Certain Provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015.

Aspect	Legal Basis of Abolishment	Consequence
Exit Permit	Law No. 13 of 2018 & Ministerial Decision No. 95 of 2019	Workers are no longer required to obtain an exit permit to leave the country. In 2018, this amendment excluded certain vulnerable groups, such as domestic and public sector employees In 2019, it was expanded, making this right universal.
No Objection Certificates (NOC) Requirement	Law No. 18 & 19 of 2020	Workers can change jobs at any time during their contract without seeking authorization from their current employer.
Table 2: Key Legal Reforms in the First Phase

Additionally, Law No. 17 of 2020 established a universal minimum wage for non-Qataris (1,000 QAR/month, plus 800 QAR for housing and food if not provided). Phase one also introduced administrative protections: Labour Dispute Resolution Committees and the Workers’ Support and Insurance Fund (WSIF), which secured wages for over 130,000 workers between 2018 and early 2025. Internationally, Qatar established Visa Centres (QVCs) in origin countries to streamline administration and curb excessive intermediary recruitment fees (Ryszard Cholewinski 2023).

Building on this success, the TCP entered Phase 2 (2021–2023) and Phase 3 (2024–2028) (Government Communications Office, State of Qatar 2024). Phase 2 introduced health insurance mandates and heat stress protections (Decision of the Minister of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs No. 17 of 2021 Specifying Measures to Protect Workers from Heat Stress; Law No. 22 of 2021 Regulating Health Care Services within the State of Qatar.). 

Cumulatively, labor mobility surged thanks to the TCP: between late 2020 and late 2022, roughly 350,000 job-change applications were approved, a stark increase from 9,000 in 2018 and 18,000 in 2019 (ILO Project Office for the State of Qatar 2021).

Unsolved Issues

However, some elements of the Kafala legal system remain. Sponsorship ties and absconding laws endure; residency renewal still depends on employers, and resigning without notification remains a criminal offense punishable by deportation. Furthermore, the system of abuse remains resilient despite tangible de jure improvements. In an interview, Mr. Ryszard Cholewinski (2023), a senior migration specialist at the ILO regional office for Arab states, notes that Kafala is “not something that you can get rid of simply by changing the law, it is deeply embedded in other measures, practices, and customs as just a way of doing things.” 

Furthermore, these positive legal amendments remain largely unknown to workers, and the legal supremacy of Arabic (Law No. 14 of 2004, art 9) impedes administrative compliance for non-speakers. Enforcement is also weak. Recruitment debt and wage theft remain prevalent; a 2020 HRW report found 72 of 93 interviewed workers faced recruitment fees, a trend echoing in recent findings. Discrepancies between official data and HRO estimates highlight this enforcement gap: in Q2 2025, the administrative office issued exactly 1 violation across 730 on-site visits to recruitment offices (Ministry of Labour, State of Qatar 2025; Javaid 2020).

Indeed, abuse remains in Qatar. As corroborated by Human Rights Watch (2025), "abusive elements of the kafala system remain intact." 

Conclusion

In conclusion, Qatar’s 2018-2025 reforms have significantly benefited foreign workers, positioning the nation as a regional forerunner in labor protection. However, the system is far from flawless and still lags globally. The US Department of State’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report still ranks Qatar in Tier 2, indicating it has not fully met minimum standards to eliminate trafficking despite significant efforts. 

Moving forward, as Qatar advances into the third stage of its TCP with a new focus on attracting skilled workers, its reforms have established a tangible legacy. Neighboring nations like Saudi Arabia are exploring similar approaches, and the ILO frequently cites Qatar as a case study for Gulf state policy (ILO Regional Office for the Arab States 2025; Kingdom of Qatar, n.d.).

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